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Integrity and its counterfeits:
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ABSTRACT The article will brieﬂy and critically review philosophical views on integrity,
focusing on integration, identity, standing up for moral principles and ethical decision-making
practice. It will explore integrity as Aristotle’s virtue of truthfulness, noting how this leads to
engagement with the self and the social network. This demands the practice of responsibility,
involving: critical agency (developing authorship of the ethical narrative), accountability
(involving plural and mutual dialogue), and creative (positive) responsibility (involving both
narrative and dialogue around action). In light of this dynamic and social view of integrity the
second part the article explores counterfeit integrity. It distinguishes counterfeit integrity
based in unexamined ideology and identity from counterfeit integrity based in intentional
deception of others about beliefs, values and motives. Each of these is illustrated by ﬁgures
from Shakespeare’s Henriad, and parallel cases in business and sport. This article is published
as part of a collection on integrity and its counterfeits.
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Philosophical perspectives of integrity
It is surprising that there is little detailed work on integrityfrom Greek philosophy or the Judaeo-Christian tradition(Cottingham, 2010). Recent work tends to stress the integrity
as either a super virtue or a virtue which connects with other
virtues (Palanski and Yammarino, 2007; Solomon, 2007, 1984;
Scherkoske, 2013). This can be viewed under four connected
heads: self-integration; identity; sustaining moral purpose; and
commitment.
Self-integration. This account of integrity suggests the integra-
tion of what Frankfurt (1971) refers to as higher order or lower
order volitions. Higher order volitions involve long-term desires,
and lower order volitions immediate desires. The higher order
volition of the drug addict, for instance, may be to be a drug-free
person and the lower order volition to take drugs. Integrity, and
with that free will, argues Frankfurt, is achieved when the lower
order volitions cohere with the higher order volitions, bringing
together volition and action, coming together in a committed
decision. Self-integration can also been seen in terms of devel-
oping a holistic integration of the self that brings together the
cognitive, affective and somatic aspects of the person (Solomon,
2007).
Identity. Williams (1973) argues for a view of integrity based in
the identity of the person. This is part of his argument against a
simple utilitarian approach. One example that he offers is of a
dignitary who is the guest of a foreign nation. He is taken to a
town square where 20 people are about to be killed as reprisals for
recent armed protests. As a signiﬁcant guest the visitor is offered
the opportunity to kill one of the 20, thus allowing the other 19 to
live. A utilitarian response might support this based on the saving
of 19 lives. In arguing against this, Williams claims that such a
calculation is inadequate because it involves going against the
core moral beliefs that make up the identity of the person.
Moral purpose. Rawls (1972) and Halfon (1989) argue that
integrity must include an acceptable moral purpose at the base.
For Rawls this would involve some clear conception of justice,
deﬁned in terms of fairness. Halfon is more circumspect, arguing
that integrity involves setting out an ethical perspective that is
conceptually clear, logically consistent, apprised of relevant
empirical evidence, and careful about acknowledging as well as
weighing relevant moral considerations. In effect, Halfon argues
that the person of integrity will give a clear account of their moral
purpose as part of following a rigorous moral decision-making
process.
Commitment. Calhoun (1995) argues for a sense of commitment
which is about “standing for something”. She argues that this
involves more than simply standing for an individual moral
purpose, but rather for a purpose recognized by some commu-
nity, which affords the basis for integrity. Integrity here is asso-
ciated explicitly with something worth striving for, and it assumes
a degree of agency, courage and perseverance that will enable the
person or group to stand up against internal and societal pres-
sures that impose obstacles to the purpose. The concern for the
practice of rational agency, for taking responsibility for holding
certain values, is echoed by Mason (2001). He argues for the
importance of respect for human dignity as a core community
principle. In all this integrity becomes more a social value than an
individual one.
Each of these approaches have had problems which focus
around critical agency and shared moral meaning. It is possible
for the SS guard to claim integrity precisely because he claims
integration of the self, a moral purpose (along with underlying
worldview), and a strong commitment (see Burleigh, 2011).
Integrity then has to take account of criticality, that is, the
capacity to critique moral purpose, identity and so on, and
complexity, that is, the presence of many different moral
narratives, which claim the moral high ground. Not surprisingly
then Halfon and Calhoun, among others, want to see the practice
of moral decision-making as a key element of integrity, a sort of
moral transparency. The problem with that is that we need to
agree on what this “process” of moral transparency might be, and
how we balance that with moral content.
Audi and Murphy’s (2006) way around this is to simply accept
that integrity has no contribution to moral content. It is to do
with the process, and thus important, but secondary. Intuitively,
this seems problematic. Whatever meaning we take integrity to
have it is something which is prized. It less a handmaid to moral
content, and more something about the self. This can be
expressed in the argument that moral decision-making is much
more than a rational reﬂection on moral concepts. Submerged
beneath the “decision-making” are psychological and social
relationships which connect to different value narratives and
worldviews (Robinson, 2008). How we handle those relationships
is precisely what integrity involves. This is partly why integrity
has to focus on major principles, such as respect and freedom.
These are core conditions of relationships. For these and other
reasons Scherkoske (2013) wants to refocus integrity as an
epistemic virtue. This precisely enables us to stand back and view
the complexity of a situation, along with the many different value
narratives, internal and external to the self. In that light, it is as
much about consciousness of the social and physical environment
as it is about a critical stance on values, moral or broader.
Robinson and Smith (2014) attempt to bring together the several
different aspects of these views into a view of integrity which
includes:
Integration. Of the different parts of the person: emotional,
psychological and intellectual. This leads to holistic thinking,
and an awareness of the self, alongside awareness and apprecia-
tion of external data.
Consistency. Between the self, values and practice; past present
and future; and different relationships, situations and contexts.
Integrity is tested most of all in the relationship with stake-
holders, who may have very different claims and perceived
needs. This demands a consistency of approach, with a clarity
about core values, and capacity to develop dialogue. The response
may not be exactly the same in every context, but will remain
consistent to the identity and purpose of the person of the
organization. Central to this is the idea of being true to purpose
and identity, requiring the practice of phronesis or practical
wisdom.
Honesty and transparency: Involving an openness to the self
and others. This raises many questions about the basis of this
openness.
Independence. This is a key element of integrity. It ensures distance,
such that the professional can stand apart from competing
interests, and more effectively focus on the core purpose, enabling
professional autonomy.
Learning process. Given the limitations of human beings, it is
impossible to have complete integrity in any static sense. Hence,
integrity is best viewed in terms of a continual learning process,
with the person discovering more about the different aspects of
the self and others and how these connect. Central to this is the
capacity to reﬂect, to evaluate practice, to be able to cope with
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criticism and to maintain, develop or alter practice appropriately.
Hence, integrity is focused in relationships, and is not purely
individualistic.
Commitment. To purpose, project and people over time, and to the
common good. The narrow view of integrity within a closed system
has to be tested against fundamental principles such as justice.
In response to such integrative approaches Curzer (2014)
hangs back. He argues for a simpler view, based in Aristotle’s
virtue of truthfulness (alētheia). This personal virtue involves
representing oneself accurately and reliably to others. The self is
seen as one’s history, one’s current character, and one’s future
projects, and expressed in one’s commitments (to ideals, values,
goals, projects), especially about those that are important to one’s
reputation. This is not a meta-virtue (cf. Solomon, 2007),
connecting many other virtues such as honesty, transparency or
authenticity, but a discrete virtue focused in being true to the self,
one’s identity. The simplicity of this is appealing. However, there
are two immediate problems. First, it attempts to solve the
problems around integrity simply by reframing the meaning, not
least by not including self-knowledge in integrity. Self-knowledge
is simply located as a different virtue (megalopsychia) which
includes greatness. The issue of self-knowledge, however, does not
go away and Cottingham (2010) argues that if integrity is about
truthfulness and the self, it must involve engagement with the
complex self and thus ongoing development of self-knowledge.
Second, as Curzer (2014) himself concedes, the self is not
univocal, but is made up of several different narratives which
relate to the different relationships, historical and contemporary.1
This takes integrity down a difﬁcult and complex journey
involving the process of engaging with the self. It also means
that the Aristotelian view of integrity, attractive though it is in
stressing the relationship between the inner and outer, or
projected, self, cannot be viewed simply in terms of consistency
between identity, values and practice. By deﬁnition the self that is
made up of different narratives (Cooper-White, 2007; Burkitt,
2008) also involves different associated relationships and thus is
constituted through the practice of those relationships, which
involves the interrogation of the related narratives. The very fact
that that there are different narratives demands such
interrogation to make sense of the self.
Developing integrity
Integrity is not then about wholeness as homogeneity, with
everything ﬁtting together, but about an honest and open
engagement with the different narratives which make up the
identity of the person (Bakhtin, 1984; Burkitt, 2008; Hermans,
2012), subjecting them to critical challenge. The different
narratives are related to different formative relationships, which
also have to be engaged with respect. In this light, integrity
involves hard work and even struggle (Cottingham, 2010;
Pianalto, 2012) and involves recognition of contradictions and
inconsistencies in the self. Often psychological pathology emerges
precisely when narratives, for whatever reason, are suppressed or
ignored (Cooper-White, 2007). All of this has discernible effect
on how the person views him or herself and the world. It is not
surprising then that unresolved psychological problems might
reinforce any “blindness” in this. Jung (1938) views such
blindness in terms of a shadow side (Beeb and Rosen, 2005; cf.
Cottingham, 2010; Fawkes, 2014). This is not a “dark” side but
rather simply the part of our behaviour or thinking we choose, at
whatever level, not to examine.
What constitutes identity, and with that a sense of the self, is
not simply decision-making (Taylor, 1989; Korsgaard, 2009;
Cottingham, 2010), but the practice of narrative and dialogue
(Burkitt, 2008) and with that the commitment to process people
and projects. Narrative, as Ricoeur (2000) argues, develops the
authorship of the person or organization. In effect this is taking
responsibility for meaning and practice (cf. Calhoun, 1995). Part
of this involves distanciation (van der Ven, 1998, Freeman, 2015)
enabling awareness of the self and the different elements of the
self (cf. Scherkoske, 2013), and part involves commitment to the
self over time.
Dialogue involves the communication of this self to others,
hence the dialogic and social self (Bakhtin, 1984; Sidorkin, 1999;
Ricoeur, 2000; Burkitt, 2008). This also involves distanciation,
enabling ongoing learning about the self in relation to the social
network. This also suggests that integrity is essentially social.
Consciousness of the self demands the perspective of others, both
in the self and beyond. Hence, Ricoeur (2000) writes of the self as
another. Such a dynamic view of integrity develops Calhoun’s
view of integrity as focused in taking responsibility.
Responsibility involves three modes, attributability, focused
in critical agency, accountability and positive responsibility
(Robinson, 2009). The ﬁrst involves taking responsibility for
critical engagement with core values, purpose, sense of worth, and
practice and its effect on the social and cultural environment.
This is core to the development of autonomous agency (Taylor,
1989), and thus to the development of identity in relationship.
This involves owning authorship. In narrative identity, the person
is not merely the one who tells the story, or merely the one about
whom the story is told, but she “appears both as a reader and the
writer of its own life” (Ricoeur, 1987: 246). Thus, the individual is
both the interpreter and the interpreted, as well as the recipient of
the interpretations. This enables awareness of otherness, of the
social and physical environment and of the self as another. This is
close both to the idea of meta-cognition (Flavell, 1987), the ability
to reﬂect on how we think, and mindfulness (Miller, 2003),
awareness of oneself in relation.
Accountability involves taking responsibility for giving an
account of this identity to the self/organization and others.
Focused in ongoing critical dialogue this enables a continual
testing of the “shadow” side, and further presentation and
development of the self-identity (Robinson, 2009). Positive
responsibility demands a shared responsibility for maintaining
both the re-presentation of core values and purpose, and
harmony among the different narratives, including the sustain-
ability of the self/organization and the core values. Such shared
responsibility demands ongoing critical dialogue about purpose
and creative response, and the negotiation of responsibility,
further representing and establishing identity (Ricoeur, 2000).
Ultimately, this moves to an opening out and testing of universal
responsibility, in the sense of shared responsibility for the self and
others (cf. Jonas, 1984; Arendt, 1991).
All this applies to both personal and organizational integrity.
Just as the person may be said to be plural, the organization,
institution or corporation may be said to be plural (Robinson,
2009). Far from having a single identity the corporation relates to
different professions, some part of all corporations, such as
accountancy and human relations, some related to the nature of
the corporation, such as engineering. Brown (2005) develops this
theme for corporations, noting ﬁve dimensions of corporate
integrity—cultural, interpersonal, organizational, social and
natural. The ﬁrst focuses on difference and disagreement in
meaning, the second integration and wholeness, the third core
purpose, the fourth on civic cooperation, and the ﬁnal on the
environment. Integrity in this light demands both commitment to
core relationships, but also awareness and appreciation of the
plurality of relationships that form the social and physical
environment. Such relationships are by deﬁnition interdependent,
and integrity demands a working through of what that requires in
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practice (Koehn, 2005). Organizational integrity in the light of
this once more requires both attention to dialogue, but also to
shared narrative such as justice, or about the nature or purpose of
the organization (Khurana and Nohria, 2008). The issue of
organizational justice relates precisely to procedural integrity.
Here procedures need to embody a shared understanding of
justice and of the core purpose of the organization.
Four things may be added to this. First, this dynamic view of
integrity connects what are often seen as different kinds of
integrity, such as personal, professional, procedural (organiza-
tional) and political (in an inclusive sense) (cf. Bauman, 2013).
Identity based in plural dialogue and the development of
narrative precisely involves all of these. Second, while this view
of integrity involves moral meaning it cannot be viewed as
exclusively a moral concept. On the contrary, integrity involves
the practice of intellectual virtues, such as practical wisdom
(phronesis, the reﬂection on the good and its embodiment),
relational/psychological virtues such as empathy, as well as moral
virtues, such as justice. Third, the practice of responsibility then is
what holds together the different virtues, exempliﬁed in the
development of dialogue and narrative (cf. Robinson, 2016). This
is slightly different from the view that integrity is either a super
virtue, connecting all of the virtues (Solomon, 2007), or simply an
epistemic virtue (cf. Flavell, 1987; Scherkoske, 2013). It is the
practice of responsibility in its three modes, mediated through
dialogue, which involves the virtues: critical agency focusing on
the practice of phronesis; accountability focusing on the practice
of empathy, courage and justice; positive responsibility focusing
on phronesis and creative virtues, including courage and
imagination. Finally, such a view of integrity demands more
than simply the development of systems of internal and external
regulation to guard against corrupt practices. The danger of such
regulation is precisely that it avoids taking responsibility for value
and practice. I will return to this as a form of counterfeit integrity.
Counterfeit integrity
The language of counterfeit with regard to integrity is important.
Counterfeit literally means imitation. Imitation is not per se false
or morally wrong. On the contrary, imitation is critical to social
learning and healthy sensorimotor development. New behaviours
are acquired via imitation. Imitation assists in communication,
social interaction, and even the ability to modulate one’s
emotions to account for the emotions of others (Gergely and
Csibra, 2005). In one sense then it is possible to see imitation as
being involved in integrity as a learning process, not least through
the development of empathy. It is less easy to see a positive view
of imitation in relation to integrity as a whole. This is principally
because integrity, as argued above, is focused in critical thinking
and thus demands that responsibility is taken for that thinking,
decision-making, accounting and related practice. Imitation of
behaviours or attitudes precisely tends to avoid such ownership of
thinking and practice. There may be very different reasons
for this.
First, integrity might be viewed precisely as non-thinking
adherence to values or ideology. This may involve unintended
self-deception, but no intentional deception of others at personal
or organizational level. Second, perceived integrity may be based
in a strong sense of identity, and the felt need to maintain
reputation. Like the ﬁrst there may be no intentional attempt to
deceive as such. Nonetheless, such integrity is not genuine
precisely because it involves both lack of critical thinking and lack
of awareness of the social and physical environment.
Third, there may be intentional re-presentation of the self as
morally good whilst practising the opposite. Here intended
counterfeit is a key part of corruption, involving attempts to
beneﬁt from deception, and the presentation of integrity is there
to disguise this behaviour. Counterfeit integrity in this sense
might be termed the instrumental re-presentation of the self. In
other words, integrity is presented primarily to pursue the narrow
interests of the person or organization (Cox et al., 1999).
Broadly then, the ﬁrst two of these involve unintended
deception and the second involves intended deception. We
should not be surprised about the extent of counterfeit integrity.
At one level there are strong motivations based in self-interest.
Some argue that this provides the basis of trust which is essential
to relationships which further particular interests, such as
business relationships (Forrest and O’Rourke 2015). At a
psychological level there are at least two motivations. First,
Festinger (1962) notes the strong desire to be seen as acceptable.
Jung writes about this in terms of the development of the persona.
The persona is in effect a mask that projects an acceptable social
image, while also concealing “the true nature of the individual”
(Jung, 1953: 190). It is important to have a ﬂexible persona to
project a sense of the self (cf. Goffman, 1956). The danger is that
the self is identiﬁed completely with the persona, leading to high
conformism, and lack of critical thinking or social awareness of
the self as distinct from the world. Second, and related, there is a
strong motivation to avoid responsibility for recognizing and
responding to complexity, not least when a complex set of
narratives, internal and external, are related to challenging
emotions (Cooper-White, 2007).
I will use three examples of leadership to explore these kinds of
counterfeit integrity taken from key ﬁgures in Shakespeare’s
Henriad, the series of plays that charts kingship from Richard II,
through Henry IV pt. I and 2, and Henry V, and add related case
studies.
Richard II
From the age of 10 Richard II was steeped in the core myth of
Christian kingship. Founded in the Judeo Christian faith and
reinforced by neo-Platonism this portrayed the king as being
divinely appointed and atop the human section of the Great
Chain of Being (Lovejoy, 1964). For Richard, the core religious
meaning of his position effectively dominated his leadership, and
was directly connected to the use of reward and punishment.
Hence, for instance, Richard speedily banishes his cousin
Bolingbroke despite his innocence. There is little attention in
his leadership to relationships, or any attempt to be accountable
for actions. The ideology of kingship dominates all, and provides
the basis of the practice of “integrity”.
The result is that Richard is literally unaware of the other,
inside or outside the court, and, with that, unaware of different
meaning associated with internal and external relationships. A
good example of this is the meaning of justice, which he
associates only with the right of kings. Justice for him is centred
in the power and need of the king, with all else a means to that
end, and all ethics and responsibility limited to this perspective.
Hence, within minutes of his uncle John of Gaunt’s death Richard
sees this as an opportunity to seize all of his resources for the Irish
campaign (Richard II, 2.1). York appeals to justice and family ties,
but Richard does not seem to comprehend this, simply repeating
the command to seize the goods. As a result the culture of the
court is, for the most part, monological, focused in one voice and
one meaning. If meaning is deﬁned exclusively in terms of divine
kingship then by deﬁnition there cannot be different, still less
challenging, views. When challenge does come from Bolingbroke,
Richard is still unable to understand an idea of justice that
transcends the authority of the king, and thus can only view
Bolingbroke’s return as an attack on the divine right of king’s.
Hence, on return from Ireland he calls for an army of angels to
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.68
4 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 2:16068 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.68 |www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms
match and meet the troops of Bolingbroke (Richard II, 3.2, 55),
reinforcing the sense of Richard’s unreal perception.
Integrity then for Richard involved the imposition of ideology
and related behaviours. Precisely because of this there was a
breakdown of reality, involving:
 Dissociation. The term involves a spectrum of detachment, from
immediate surroundings, to, more severe, from physical and
emotional experience (Cooper-White, 2007). Dissociative beha-
viour involves a detachment from reality, something which has
similarities to psychosis, in which reality is lost (Callender, 2010).
 Projection. This psychological theory (Callender, 2010) suggests
that individuals defend themselves against difﬁcult impulses
through denying them in themselves and attributing them to
others. Hence, someone who feels anger might project this
anger on to others, accusing them of bullying, rudeness and so
on. Typically such leaders will characterize others as aggressive,
leading to,
 Polarization. This involves polarizing ideas and groups,
focusing on a defensive stance against other groups (Cohen,
2001). Thinking in these cases inevitably moves to ad hominem
arguments, focused in the person of the opponent not the issue
at question.
 Denial of responsibility. As Bauman (1989) notes this leads of
denial of responsibility and shifting of blame (cf. Cohen, 2001).
This is characteristic of people and organizations who are
unable to capture plurality as part of their identity, or who
operate in fragmented parts of their lives. As Ricoeur (2000)
notes this is less about engagement and more about defence of
the person or organization. The result of this in organizations is
a culture of fear.
 Denial of people and practice, or their signiﬁcance. A key effect
of this is on perception, both of phenomena and of the
signiﬁcance of phenomena. The leader may see effects in the
social networks, but simply not understand their signiﬁcance.
Typically this will lead to the “other” as being dehumanized.
In Richard’s case there is a monovocal identity and the absence of
any of the three modes of responsibility. Richard’s perception is,
of course, tested by the subsequent meetings, both in the
battleﬁeld and the court. And as Richard lets go of his authority
and power, he reﬂects at length on his identity, beginning to see
himself as a human being apart from his identity as leader (IV, 1).
In Jungian terms this involves the breakdown or disintegration of
the persona (cf. Homans, 1995: 100–102). Typically for
Shakespeare there is ambiguity. This can be seen either as
Richard’s gradual disintegration or as his discovery of his real self,
something remarkable in the light of the culture of the time (IV,
1, V, 5). Either way, Richard as a leader is unable to balance
meaning, identity, and relationships, which resulted in him
abusing his power. There is no persuasion, only coercion. There is
no awareness of limitations, or awareness of the social
environment or its signiﬁcance. The central myth is unquestioned
and unquestionable, and meaning beyond that, such as universal
ideas of justice not understood. Articulation of the ideology and
identity is rehearsed with no practice of genuine dialogue.
Similar ideological dominance was there with Alan Greenspan
who was central to the credit crisis (Heffernan, 2012). Underlying
Greenspan’s values was a belief in negative freedom, that is,
freedom from coercion (Berlin, 1968). His world view was deeply
inﬂuenced by the philosophy of Rand. Rand’s, (1992: 1170–1171)
objectivist philosophy was summed up by her as, “the concept of
man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral
purpose of his life, with productive achievement as his noblest
activity, and reason as his only absolute”. The individualized base
of this philosophy suggests little connection to the wider society
or environment, and certainly no sense of responsibility. Even
more problematic is the view of reason as an absolute, denying
the role of the affect. Parallel with this was an almost mystical
view of the market. He believed that, whatever happened, the
market would adjust (cf. Heffernan, 2012). Hence, he was unable
to recognize the signiﬁcance of what he saw, including over a
hundred smaller, but connected, ﬁnancial crises in the years
before the credit crisis.
Hotspur
Hotspur in Henry IV shows a counterfeit integrity based more in
personal psychology rather than ideology. It focuses on perceived
harm to reputation and immediate recourse to “satisfaction”.
Once more this is not a counterfeit integrity based in deception
but rather uncritical imitation of what is perceived as integrity,
focused in Homeric heroics and honour. As Edmundson (2015)
suggests Hotspur cannot take a joke. He interprets all responses
as either an insult to himself or support for him as hero.
For Hotspur, the rebel, and son of Northumberland, integrity is
focused largely in the sense of standing up for reputation and being
prepared to respond immediately to any challenge. The effects of
this counterfeit integrity are much the same as Richard II’s,
involving polarization and denial of responsibility. Henry IV,
admires Hotspur’s character and his narrative, focused in honesty,
transparency and courage, and wishes that perhaps he were his
son.2 However, in the comparison with Henry V’S view of honour
it is clear that Shakespeare does not see it as wholly admirable.
Hotspur does not take responsibility for questioning the base of his
integrity. His response is determined by his “nature”, losing any
sense of self-determination, a critical aspect of integrity. It is
important to note that, like Richard, Hotspur chooses to do this,
that is, though his thinking and actions are determined he is
responsible for this. Hence, though neither intended to deceive
they had in fact deceived themselves in relation to their social
network. The identity at the heart of this is that of the hero, always
ready to respond and bring down the other who offends, however
powerful. This sense of counterfeit integrity is related in
Shakespeare to tragedy. Figures such as Othello or Leontes (A
Winter’s Tale) have elements that are admirable, but cannot engage
either the truth about themselves or the truth of others.
In business there is strong parallel with the Brent Spar case
(Entine, 2002). The battle for Brent Spar involved Shell and
Greenpeace who disagreed about the environmentally responsible
way of decommissioning this offshore oil storage facility.
Greenpeace consciously took the role of hero, ﬁghting against
the powerful TNC. They saw the proposed sinking of the Brent
Spar as environmentally irresponsible.
In the subsequent “battle”, Greenpeace managed the publicity
such that when the Spar began to be towed off to the deeper sea
they boarded, casting this as it a battle of integrity between proﬁt
hungry multinational and the NGO who represented the
environment. The result was that that Shell backed down under
the pressure of intense publicity. It was only later that the
Greenpeace action and the data that they based it on were
questioned. Shell argued that there was only 53 tonnes of toxic
sludge or oil on the Spar. Greenpeace argued that there was over
14,5000 tonnes of toxic rubbish and over 100 tonnes of toxic
sludge. An independent study late noted that was between 74 and
100 tonnes of oil on board the Spar, and that the greater part of
this could have been removed easily (Entine, 2002). At the heart
of the Greenpeace reaction was a strong sense of their heroic
identity, and thus the importance of their taking on Shell in a very
direct way. The focus on this identity partly accounted for their
polarized view of Shell, their lack of awareness of the actual data
in the case, and for the avowed determination to react in similar
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ways even after the independent review of the incident (Entine,
2002). This showed limited practice of the ﬁrst two modes of
responsibility. Entine (2002) argues for the importance of NGOs
developing dialogue around identity and purpose and about data,
representing a much sharper view of integrity.
Once more this suggests counterfeit integrity, without intent to
deceive others. The ﬁnal example from Shakespeare, however, can
be characterized as involving deception.
Falstaff
Falstaff represents the other extreme of counterfeit integrity. He
attempts to establish this intentionally, through deception.
Falstaff, in Henry IV Parts 1 and 2, develops this through a
number of means, including: building a narrative of honour;
building a narrative of honesty that attempts to subvert a
dominant view of honour; gaining sympathy through rhetoric;
and buttressing the narratives with different associations. In the
ﬁrst of these he builds up a narrative of honour, based in
supposed success against robbers or on the battleﬁeld. In the
latter he claims to have killed Hotspur on the battleﬁeld, who had
in fact been already killed by Hal (Henry V to be). His story is
that Hotspur in fact recovered. Falstaff, himself a knight, wants to
maintain a narrative of honour and heroism. Despite doubts Hal
accepts and thus reinforces this narrative.
Secondly, key to the narrative of deception is not just Falstaff’s
ostentatious practice of the Homeric hero but also other likeable,
rather than admirable, characteristics. He claims a narrative of
plain speaking, and honesty (Henry IV Parts 1, 2, 4),
characteristics both associated with integrity. He also claims to
be on the side of the ordinary person, and this very much in his
major speech about honour,
Can honour set to a leg? no: or an arm? no: or take away the
grief of a wound? no. Honour hath no skill in surgery, then?
no. What is honour? a word. What is in that word honour?
what is that honour? air. A trim reckoning! Who hath it? he
that died o’ Wednesday. Doth he feel it? no. Doth he hear it?
no. ’Tis insensible, then. Yea, to the dead. But will it not live
with the living? no. Why? detraction will not suffer it.
Therefore I’ll none of it. Honour is a mere scutcheon: and so
ends my catechism. (Henry IV 1, V 1).
This is a remarkable speech partly because it can be seen as
standing up for the ordinary man; there is no working class
experience of honour, and Falstaff is in sympathy with that. This
can be seen as a critique of the value of honour; further
reinforcing a sense of integrity. We can almost see him as a hero
for the common man, standing out against Hotspur’s view of
honour. The speech, of course, is a monologue carefully focused
at the audience. Shakespeare is intentionally drawing in the
audience to support Falstaff. Similarly, Falstaff, in a role play with
Hal, each taking the part of Henry IV, shows off splendid
rhetorical devices, aimed at both convincing the king of his
integrity but also showing that Falstaff does not, unlike Hotspur,
take himself too seriously. In response to the “king’s” challenge he
rounds off his peroration with,
No, my good lord; banish Peto,
banish Bardolph, banish Poins: but for sweet Jack
Falstaff, kind Jack Falstaff, true Jack Falstaff,
valiant Jack Falstaff, and therefore more valiant,
being, as he is, old Jack Falstaff, banish not him
thy Harry’s company, banish not him thy Harry’s
company: banish plump Jack, and banish all the world. (Henry
IV, 1: 2, 4)
Characteristic of such counterfeit integrity are attempts then to
buttress the heroic narrative with signiﬁcant relationships. Others
then see that the persons and the narrative are supported by the
others who, in effect, speak up for the integrity of the person and
the narrative. If others support the person then he must have
integrity. In Falstaff’s case he is buttressed by his tight band of
friends in Cheapside. Indeed, he brings his supporters together
around his charismatic leadership. Falstaff brooked few questions,
batting these off with banter or ad hominem arguments. In this
Falstaff generates a strong emotional appeal which superseded
critical dialogue.
Much of his time is spent in buttressing his view with the
support of Hal, and eventually Henry V (Henry IV 1: 3, 4). This is
the basis of his relationship to Justice Sly, “demonstrating” his
trustworthiness. He is relying on Henry V’s support at the end of
Henry IV pt. 2 when he races to see the newly crowned king;
ultimately, of course, looking for money to pay his debt. He is
met, however, with this resounding response,
I know thee not old man, fall to thy prayers’
How ill white hairs become a fool and jester!
I have long dream’d of such a kind of man,
So surfeit-swell’d, so old and so profane;
But, being awaked, I do despise my dream.
Make less thy body hence, and more thy grace. (2 Henry IV,
5.5)
This is one of the most powerful moments in Shakespeare,
thought by many to be cruel. Whatever one thinks of Henry V’s
actions that day, Henry shows here the importance of boundaries,
and of making boundaries clear in leadership. Setting boundaries
is critical to integrity (Robinson, 2008), not least because it helps
to establish identity and enables awareness of the self and the
other (Ricoeur, 2000). Without boundaries there is also a loss of
meaning.
This reveals the underlying realty of Falstaff’s actual motivation
and behaviour. In effect, he tries to imitate responsibility, through
the accounts he gives of narrative and action and through
claiming a critical perspective. This also points to a form of
counterfeit integrity focused in “doing the right thing” in order to
gain favour with others. In Falstaff’s case the attempt to gain
favour was an intentional ploy to further his interests. In fact, he
practised robbery, desecration of the dead (in stabbing the dead
Hotspur), and fraud (using army recruitment to make money). In
so doing Falstaff ignores or attempts to blur moral, legal and
relational boundaries, and so not surprisingly does not know how
to address the new king.
Much the same issues are there in the case of Lance Armstrong,
the Olympic and Tour de France cyclist, found guilty of doping in
2012. In that case, however, he was more effective in developing
the covering narratives. His end was nonetheless equally
cataclysmic. The ﬁrst element in the Armstrong case was the
development of a tightly controlled team culture focused in
doping. The USADA (2012) Reasoned Decision document
concluded, “He was not just a part of the doping culture, he
enforced and re-enforced it. Armstrong’s use of drugs was
extensive, and the doping programme on his team, designed in
large part to beneﬁt Armstrong, was massive and pervasive”
(USADA, 2012: 5–6).
The dynamics reﬂected that of a cult. The classic view of cults
(New Religious Movements, NRMs) involves several elements.
First, NRMs are controlled by single leaders who have total power
over the group, focused in charismatic leadership. Second, NRMs
have strong control mechanisms. These range from the “disciple”
who is assigned to the new member and ensures his or her total
adherence to ideas and practice, to what some critics of NRMs
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have described as mind control techniques. At one level this
might be what Barker (1992) refers to as thought stopping—the
use of spiritual techniques, such as repeated mantras, that focus
on states of mind. Another aspect may be the development of
emotional dependence. Hence, cults use “love bombing”, initial
high care for the new recruit, followed by the threat of expulsion
if the recruit does not fulﬁl set conditions. In Armstrong’s case
even the racing team ofﬁcials were involved in disciplining team
members including intimidating one of Armstrong’s teammates,
David Zabriskie, into taking EPO (Erythropoietin). The effect on
the team was to increase stress and fear. The aim of such
leadership is to infantilize the members of the group, thus
diminishing rational autonomy, and the capacity to handle
ambiguity. Hence, key to the corruption was the development of
culture which centred on a polarized view of the team in relation
to the sport and the rest of the world. The ﬁxed purpose of the
team was to elevate Armstrong and hence defend him against any
external threats. Typically therefore any questions about the team
were met with ad hominem arguments. The questioners were out
“to get” Armstrong. When federal agent Jeff Novitsky was
assigned to investigate the team, Armstrong (Albergotti, 2013)
even hired a lobbyist to develop a position against him, which
proved unsuccessful. Armstrong was developing then a culture
which radically affected how the sporting and wider world was
perceived. As Nussbaum (1990) observes, ethics is as much about
perception of the world as about moral judgement. All of this
radically affected the sense of identity of the team, placing
defensiveness above critical questioning of practice.
In addition to these elements of cult dynamic, which disabled
any critical agency. Armstrong built up his image. This was,
indeed, a triumph of image over integrity, built upon two
narratives. The ﬁrst narrative was of the Homeric hero. Homeric
heroism is often characterized as involving a charismatic
individual who succeeds against all the odds, including monsters.
In Armstrong’s case this led precisely to the larger than life image
of the man who could conquer any cycling challenge. In his case
the absolute value was winning, and all rationality revolved round
that. The winning reinforced the heroic image and with that the
hero worship. This general adulation further reinforced the
pressure on the team to maintain the culture. Members were part
of that reﬂected glory, afﬁrming their worth.
If this were not enough, a second heroic narrative emerged. In
1996 testicular cancer was diagnosed, with advanced secondaries.
Armstrong refused radiotherapy because of the effect this might
have had on his balance. Writing for Psychology Today in 2012
Robertson suggested that Armstrong’s ﬁght with cancer remains
both heroic and moral, “he endured regime after gruelling regime
of chemotherapy until the exhausted but poisoned cells of his
body ﬁnally expelled the cancer. Just two years later, in 1998, in a
supreme act of physical and moral courage, he started competing
again, and in 1999, he won the Tour de France. Doping or no
doping, this is the stuff of heroes” (Robertson, 2012).
Robertson goes on to suggest that Armstrong remains a great
man, and that all great men are ﬂawed (cf. Windsor, 2015). This
is ampliﬁed by Windsor (2015) who records Armstrong’s doctor
arguing that he remains a hero to all cancer patients. The
inference is that the victims of much of the fall of Armstrong were
in fact cancer patients. This narrative reinforces the heroic image
of Armstrong to almost untouchable heights, further reinforcing
the pressure on the team. It adds sympathy to admirable heroism.
In addition to the power of the heroic narratives Armstrong
built ﬂying buttresses to further support the counterfeit integrity.
In particular, he built relationships with media and business
which brought in money to the sport, further reinforcing the
support of the governing body of cycling. Sponsors also included
the US Postal Service and Discovery, who both wanted to be
associated with the heroic narratives, but also brought to the table
strong value narratives of service and learning, and which further
reinforced the heroic narratives. The picture was complete. If
integrity involves the re-presentation of the self over time then
this reinforced the presentation of an ideal, heroic self, which
could not be questioned, demanding unthinking trust.
Henry V
If we return to Shakespeare, it becomes clear then that the ﬁgure
of integrity for him is Henry V. Henry continually opens himself,
as son, prince and king to critical dialogue, testing his view of
himself. He sustains that through holding together multiple
dialogues which hold together a plural self (Burkitt, 2008;
Hermans, 2012). A good illustration of this is the St Crispin’s
Day Speech (Henry V 4, 3). The speech is not an exercise in
rhetorical rabble rousing but is focused on complexity, involving
multiple dialogues and narratives, with, among others, God and
Henry’s dead father (conjuring up Henry’s guilt about his
relationship with his father and the wider religious guilt about
how Richard II’s throne was taken), his leaders, his troops
(including troops from different parts of Britain), and the enemy.
The speech culminates in dialogue with the French Herald who
offers to save the lives of Henry’s troops through offering him for
ransom. This is precisely the issue which Henry’s troops were
fearful about, leading to an expression of lack of trust in the king.
To offer himself for ransom would have questioned the worth of
comrades who had been killed earlier in the campaign. Hence, all
the troops were there to hear Henry decline the French offer. The
dialogue then is focused in values, worth, purpose and identity,
involving affective, cognitive and relational elements. As such the
dialogue is open and unrehearsed, with Henry prepared to give
account at any point, and prepared to wrestle with the affective
elements of the complex social environment.
As noted above it is precisely this form of plural dialogue,
which embodies integrity. I also suggested earlier that genuine
integrity was not about systems thinking or group think, but
about how members of an organization can take responsibility for
meaning and practice in relation to the meaning and practice of
the organization. Henry’s integrity reﬂects exactly that. He
enables vision and purpose to be engaged, but through honest
dialogue, internal and external. The exercise of dialogue itself
develops trust, partly because it demonstrates empathy, and
partly because it requires critical challenge, through engaging
difference. In moral terms this engages equal respect, freedom
and justice. In intellectual terms it engages rationality, intellectual
and affective. In psychological terms it engages perceptions of
worth. In political terms it engages the imagination, the
possibilities of shared responsibility. Such dialogue is precisely
what bridges the so called problem of agency and structure,
because it recognizes that so called “structure” is built up of
relationships and many different narratives.
Underscoring this development is Hal’s (Henry V) own
development of the meaning of honour. This is a more profound
sense of honour than Hotspur or Falstaff and with it a more
mature sense of integrity. Integrity is not simply about standing up
for principles and maintaining reputation, it is also about an
openness to learn from critical challenge, and the importance of
practical wisdom, knowing when to make a response and knowing
that the purpose has to be greater than simply “satisfying” honour.
This takes us to a more thought through Renaissance view of
honour centred in humanity and in balance, not in the narrow
identity of the leader. Falstaff might legitimately challenge the
latter, with integrity individualized, but the former challenges
Falstaff. It is ultimately this sense of shared honour which provides
the basis for a united vision before Agincourt, but one that feeds
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into narratives of home and community as well as army life, with
all engaging plural narratives.
This brings us back to the dichotomy, set up by Audi and
Murphy (2006), between moral content and process. The two are
connected by the practice of responsibility and related virtues.
Critical agency, accountability and creative responsibility are
evidenced through ongoing dialogue and where there is no
evidence of that dialogue there is danger of counterfeit integrity.
This can also extend to a systems response to corruption that is,
one focused in regulation but not in the development of
responsibility. This can have the effect of discouraging the
practice of dialogue and professional judgment (cf. Goodpaster,
2007). The focus on systems control of corruption then can lead
to “crowding out” the virtues (Moore, 2012). As Eliot put it,
They try to escape
From the darkness outside and within
By dreaming of systems so perfect that no one will need to
be good. (Eliot, 2004: 158).
Ironically, the rise of systems thinking is often associated with
the practice of accountability. However, the practice of account-
ability without critical agency can precisely lead to instrumental
rationality and isomorphism (Thompson and Bevan, 2013).
Conclusion
This article has suggested that counterfeit integrity can involve
unintended or intended deception. Key to the ﬁrst of these is
reliance on ideology or identity, which is not subject to critical
scrutiny or the challenge of dialogue. Key to the second is careful
building of a narrative which is emotionally powerful, and which
intentionally runs counter to practice. This builds a perspective
that is difﬁcult to criticize, and which draws in different
organizations and persons to become, in effect, part of the
counterfeit integrity. Emerging from this is the suggestion that
integrity has to involve the practice of all modes of responsibility
individually and organizationally, and that this is focused in
complexity and dialogue.
Notes
1 Hence, in Hamlet, Polonius’s aphorism to his son, ‘and, above all to thine own self be
true’ (Act 1 Scene 3) reﬂects not Shakespeare’s belief in a single self, but Polonius’s lack
of awareness about the complex self. It is precisely such as complex self that Hamlet
inhabits.
2 In Hotspur there are strong elements of celebrity which Marshall notes relates directly
to persona (see Marshall and Barbour 2015).
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